



As recently as a decade ago they made up one of the most prosperous and attractive 
parts of the former Soviet Union, with a strong sense of national identity and rich 
cultural heritage. The post-Soviet period has been long enough for Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia to establish themselves as independent states deciding their fate. Each has 
gone a long way in building its own statehood.  
 
But there is still something that unites them, but it is no longer positive. Widespread 
impoverishment, low living standards, rampant corruption, battered public 
infrastructures and mass emigration. Probably nowhere else has the collapse of 
Communism brought so much destruction and misery. That is the bitter truth about 
what was supposed to be a transition to democracy and market economy.  
 
Despite more or less equal starting conditions, the countries of the South Caucasus have 
lagged far behind East European states and ex-Soviet Baltic republics that already feel 
benefits of the free market. The chasm between them will turn into an abyss if recent 
years’ trends continue. The deeper the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian peoples get 
stuck in their economic doldrums the more difficult it will be for them to find the path 
of development. Any further delay with solutions would cost the present and future 
generations dearly.  
 
The past century was proof that, when allied to democracy and the rule of law, free 
enterprise always means a decent life for the vast majority of citizens. That is the 
essence of the "Western model" of society, the results of which are so visible.  
 
All of the three Caucasian states have failed to embrace that model as the basis of their 
reform strategy. Citizens’ right to change their government through elections has been 
severely restricted, if not denied, while government connections have been essential for 
engaging in entrepreneurial activity. Corruption and problems with the rule of law have 
stifled fair business competition, scaring off both domestic and foreign investors.  
 
There is also another factor that dealt a devastating blow to the economies of the three 
neighbors. The conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia rendered 
the region one of the most unstable and dangerous parts of the world. Even though the 
region has seen no large-scale hostilities for more than six years, its highly negative 
image lingers on.  
 
Also in place are economic blockades, closed borders, ravaged infrastructures and, 
above all, uncertainty about the future. This reality goes against one of the main rules of 
the market economy: unfettered flow of goods and capital.  
 
Common sense suggests that economic recovery is impossible without Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia opting for the Western model and making the region a safe 
place for business.  
 
Democratization and other political reforms are vital for economic development, but 
their prospects are uncertain in all three countries. None of them can be considered a 
functioning democracy with free and fair elections and strong political parties. 
Therefore, political transformation is likely to take many more years.  
 
Its success will be in question unless socioeconomic hardships are somehow alleviated 
in the near future. There seems to be no way that can happen if the uncertainty about 
peace and stability in the region persists.  
 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia stand little chances of crawling out of the post-Soviet 
swamp without massive foreign investments. Even a distant look at their 
macroeconomic indicators suffices to bear out that assertion. They can now boast GDPs 
per capita hovering between $600 and $800 and official average salaries varying from 
$35 to $45. These are figures comparable to the level of development of many African 
countries.  
 
A single-digit growth registered by the three struggling economies since the mid-1990s 
could not have had a major impact on living standards, with a sizable part of the 
population remaining out of work. Domestic consumer demand is too weak to generate 
a more robust growth, while the absence of advanced technologies hampers the 
development of local export-oriented industries. 
 
The past decade has demonstrated that reforms have been a success in those ex-
Communist nations that have attracted substantial foreign investment. The Caucasus has 
seen a far more modest influx of Western capital and has been paying a heavy price for 
that. Azerbaijan’s oil sector may be an exception. But its impact on the rest of the 
Azerbaijani economy, especially its job-creating capacity, has proved to be quite 
limited. It appears that a number of things must be in place in order for foreign investors 
to take an interest in the war-ravaged region.  
 
First is the existence of acceptable and stable "rules of the game". The Western model 
guarantees this through independent judiciary and a business-friendly institutional 
framework. The high level of corruption and nepotism in the countries of the South 
Caucasus is hardly encouraging for potential investors. There is no reason to expect this 
situation to change dramatically in the next few years. Even so, investors may come to 
the region in larger numbers if other, no less important conditions are met.  
 
The threat of renewed fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh and other hot spots bodes ill for 
foreign investment. Little progress has been made in the search for a political settlement 
of the conflicts, and prospects for a lasting peace are uncertain. Potential investors are 
well aware of this reality.  
 
One of the most far-reaching consequences of regional peace would the re-opening of 
Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which would pave the way for the 
movement of goods and capital across the region, something which this is indispensable 
for economic growth in the era of globalization.  
 
Open borders and weak trade barriers would be a huge step in the region’s 
transformation into a sort of single market. A foreign company opening a factory say in 
Armenia would have its primary market increasing from 3.5 to 16 inhabitants. Renewed 
rail and road communication with Russia, Turkey and Iran would add to the market 
expansion. Settlement of the regional conflicts would thus allow the South Caucasus to 
cast off its negative image.  
 
Leading Western powers already promise a hefty aid package for Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia as an additional incentive for conflict resolution. Much of the promised 
money (some reports speak of billions of dollars) would go to finance the reconstruction 
of their infrastructures and could serve as a catalyst of future foreign investments. 
Western firms taking part in the reconstruction work could thus get a foothold on local 
economies and think of longer-term commercial projects. Their presence could arouse a 
greater international business interest in the area, largely confined to Azerbaijani oil 
reserves at present.  
 
In addition, a reopening of direct commerce between Armenia and Turkey and 
Azerbaijan would give a strong boost to economic activity throughout the region. For 
one thing, Armenia would be able to restore railway connection not only with its two 
traditional foes but also with Iran, Russia and even Europe. For an economy suffocating 
from high transportation costs this would be quite a relief.  
 
In sum, a re-birth of regionwide economic links, backed up by an influx of foreign aid 
and capital, is the sole remedy of enormous socioeconomic woes crippling the three 
Caucasian states.  
 
The idea of regional integration, first floated by the West, seems to be increasingly 
popular among local elites, especially liberal technocrats. Several ways of putting it 
practice have already been suggested. All of them prioritize economic cooperation and 
call for a regional "security system". The most far-reaching and in-depth document yet 
was drafted this year by the Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), a Brussels-
based think-tank. At the heart of its "Stability Pact for the Caucasus" is the idea of the 
"South Caucasus Community" modeled after the European Union.  
 
One may find unrealistic its call for supranational regional institutions, shared 
sovereignty, policy coordination and a free trade regime. The three countries, after all, 
are not as "European" as they portray themselves. Besides, Armenians and Azerbaijanis 
are too far from perceiving common interests.  
 
And yet the idea should not be dismissed as infeasible just because it sounds so 
unbelievable to local pundits. One may question certain elements of the CEPS plan, but 
its core concept is definitely correct.  
 
The creation of the South Caucasus Community may indeed be a long way off, but the 
process can already be set in motion. Again, a normalization of relations would alone 
give a powerful impetus to regional integration. As the Armenian, Azerbaijani and other 
peoples deepen direct contacts and see mutual benefits, conditions will become ripe for 
transforming the region into a single economic and possibly political space.  
 
With its ambitions projects such as TRACECA and ideas like the Stability Pact, Europe 
gives Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia a chance to join the "civilized" world, to get 
their citizens out of misery and to live at peace. The alternative is continued poverty, 
exodus of the skilled workforce, corruption, threat of renewed wars and vulnerability to 
external manipulation. They must not fail to seize upon this opportunity. 
 
The protracted economic slump has also blighted the institutions of civil society in all 
three nations, resulting in a sharp decline in educational standards and "pauperization" 
of a large part of the population. The de-industrialization and shrinkage of their 
economies adversely affects democratization. Impoverished, desperate and hopeless 
people are much easier manipulated by the corrupt elites. In Armenia, for example, 
citizens’ readiness to accept vote bribes (unthinkable several years ago) spares ruling 
circles the need to falsify elections.  
 
Quick economic recovery is therefore vital for the development of democracy in this 
part of the world. Rising living standards would inevitably increase pressure for popular 
participation in the political life. The existing situation is a fertile ground for populism 
and demagogy that heightens public disillusionment with reforms.  
 
Of all the obstacles to the realization of these ideas the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is 
undoubtedly the most serious. Many other problems hampering integration would 
disappear once a solution is found to the decade-long dispute. Positions of the 
conflicting parties are still too different. A mutually acceptable peace deal can be 
achieved, however. Most realistic, it appears, is a Bosnia-type "unconventional" 
formula that would place Karabakh and Azerbaijan under a loose state umbrella. The 
OSCE Minsk Group’s most recent peace plan apparently goes along the same lines.  
 
A settlement based on mutual compromise may be on the cards if the Russian, 
American and French co-chairs of the Group act in a more assertive way, which 
requires a more high-level diplomacy similar to one we have seen in the Middle East 
and the Balkans.  
 
None of the parties would find it easy to sell a deal on Karabakh to the domestic public. 
In Azerbaijan, the mainstream opposition will not agree to anything more than a 
conventional autonomy status for Karabakh. Similarly, there will not be lack of 
opponents in Armenia of a possible arrangement that would give the enclave only de-
facto independence. Still, the authorities in Yerevan and Baku are currently strong 
enough to withstand domestic opposition. But that may not last forever, considering the 
old age of Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliev.  
 
There is also a big question mark over Russia’s true intentions with regard to the South 
Caucasus. The dominant view in the West, particularly in the United States, is that 
Moscow is not interested in peace because it fears losing its main leverage over the 
regional states. Things might not be so clear-cut on closer inspection though. If Russia 
is given a stake in the new regional order it could act as one of its main guarantors, 
especially when it comes to peace-keeping operations.  
 
One of the merits of the CEPS’s Stability Pact is that it seeks to bring the Russians into 
play. CEPS experts believe that Russian, EU and US interests in the Caucasus "are not 
necessarily divergent". The region is also "the terrain where a new chapter of, 
hopefully, constructive cooperation can be opened between Russia and the West", 
according to them.  
 
Besides, Moscow’s capacity to scuttle a Karabakh settlement will diminish if there is a 
genuine will to end the conflict from the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides. The ball is on 
their court. They should act before it becomes too late. 
